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FOREWORD 
The release of this publication highlights the successful inauguration of 
the Queen s Annual Business Law Symposium. This event held in the fall of 
1994 marked the beginning of an annual business law symposium to be 
organized by the Symposium's Executive, the Queen's Corporate Law and 
Investment Club and the Queen's University Faculty of Law. This symposium 
demonstrates the Faculty of Law's strong commitment to teaching and re­
search in the broad area of business and corporate law. 
The quality of the inaugural symposium and the papers contained in this 
book augurs well for the future of the Queen's Annual Business Law Svmpo­
sium. I was delighted that so many distinguished speakers lent their presence 
to this event and submitted papers for publication. The annual symposium 
should provide a valuable opportunity for both practitioners and academics to 
work toward solutions to some of the more pressing problems facing the 
business and corporate law community. 
The Queen's Faculty of Law is particularly grateful to all those who 
assisted in organizing the inaugural symposium. The Advisory Board provided 
invaluable advice all through the planning stages. We are most grateful to 
those firms and organizations that provided financial support to make this 
event possible. Particular mention must also be made of the many hours that 
the members of the Symposium's Planning Committee spent on this project. 
Their commitment to this project has been unwavering and to them must go 
the greatest credit for the success of the inaugural symposium. 
Don Carter 
Dean. Queen's University Faculty of Law 
COMMENTS ON "GATEKEEPERS AND THE 
COMMISSION: THE ROLE OF PROFESSIONALS 
IN THE REGULATORY SYSTEM" 
Mary G. Condon 
The theme of Beck's paper is that there is a need to re-examine the issue 
of the accountability of professionals, particularly lawyers, who act for clients 
in securities-related transactions. The role of law and lawyers in securities 
regulation has in the past been considered from the standpoint of the influence 
of legal professionals and legal ideas (such as those of fairness and equity) on 
the content of regulation and the practices of regulators.1 Beck's paper, 
however, considers the position of lawyers, not as the creators and shapers of 
regulation, but as objects of it. 
As I read the paper, it deals with at least three aspects of the issue of 
lawyers' accountability: (1) the rationale for enhanced accountability of law­
yers (the "why" question); (2) the appropriate parameters of such responsibil­
ity (the "for what" question); and (3) the mechanisms for accomplishing it (the 
"how" question). To a non-specialist in this field, the paper is a comprehensive 
and provocative presentation of the relevant issues. My own sense is that the 
most contentious aspect of it is likely to be the proposition itself, as opposed 
to its implementation, so it is in this area that I will concentrate my remarks. 
Why? 
Beck's paper advances at least two reasons for reconsidering the question 
of exacting more accountability from legal advisors. The first of these con­
cerns the role of lawyers as "facilitators" of financial transactions, in the 
context of their on-going relationships with clients. As gatekeepers of complex 
1 See Condon, M., Ideas and Regulatory Practice: The Ontario Securities Commission 
1945-1978, SJD Thesis, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, 1991 and Macintosh, J. 
"The Canadian Securities Administrators' Takeover Proposals: Old Wine in Old Bottles? 
(1993) 22(2) Canadian Business Law Journal 231. 
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regulatory obligations and financial opportunities, their involvement and 
vnortke makes transactions possible. _ 
Beck's argument here may, I think, be supported by drawing a p»ra  le  
nosition of legal advisors in securities transactions and that of 
Terwriters in a distribution of securities by prospectus. Civil liability for 
representation in a prospectus is currently imposed on underwriters by 
f, 30(b) of the Ontario Securities Act. The accepted rationale is that investor 
nrotectkm objectives require the discipline of potential liability to be imposed 
„ an independent professional involved in the prospectus process. Can a 
• ior ircmment be mobilised about the situation ot lawyers advising clients 
rmandam. V disclosure requirements? Sceptics will argue that the legislature 
has not to date supported the proposition that legal counsel acting for issue 
or underwriters in the prospectus process should be rendered liable, excep in 
specified situations. Nevertheless, acknowledgement of the importance of the 
principle that independent professionals should be encouraged ° 
role seriously is a separate point from the question of the form that 
enC°s3em "Apropos,ttonconcerrnngthegmekeep.rolerflegtd 
advisors. Beck cites the high cost to taxpayers of past and po ential regdalory 
failures, where professionals may be uniquely positioned to ale , aherpame 
to potential or actual wrongdoing, or indeed to prevent it taking. pla e. The 
plausibility of this argument would be augmented by empirical dem°^rat l°" 
that incidents of lack of professional responsibility have,»"crea^d 
warrant greater accountability mechanisms. Does such evidence e™ . Are the 
regulatory failure problems perhaps limited to the inancial insutut on area, 
because of factors unique to that sector (for examP le ' \f e";'eraf°) ice "f 
mercial risk-taking)? Alternatively, is there evidence that the practic of 
securities law is stratified such that specific types of clientso types 
transaction are especially problematic from a regulatory point of i. 
More consequentially, ,s there any evidence that financialfa,lure piob 
lems could be solved by increasing advisor accountability? ScepU" 
again argue that, given that the ultimate objective ,s better-quality c1,^closure 
of information (to the market and/or regulators), a thorough analysis^ofthe 
problem would require consideration of alternative strategies for «amp 
increasing the adverse consequences for clients o engagi t  tj,e 
loss-occasioning, transactions without adequate disclosure in 
current debate about civil liability for issuers misrepresenting information 
non-prospectus or similar materials may be significant. 
7 sso ?fiO describes the additional reporting requirements 
2 In this connection, the paper, at pp. 259--60. . .  Ontario Loan and Trust 
imposed on professionals dealing clients regulated by the Ontar 
Corporations, 1987. 
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It is possible to propose some reasons, additional to those identified in 
the paper, for revisiting the issue of legal advisor accountability. First it 
should not be forgotten that the goal of maintaining and furthering investor 
confidence in the capital markets is now expressly within the mandate of the 
OSC.? Would the ability of the regulator to sanction legal advisors in appro­
priate cases produce such confidence to a greater degree than at present? This 
is again an empirical question, but it is at least arguable that if the case can be 
made about underwriters, it can equally be made about lawyers. 
Relatedly, and somewhat more provocatively, there is the question of the 
benefits obtained by professionals from the regulatory system as it currently 
operates. Phillips and Zecher, in their book entitled The SEC and the Public 
Interest,4 conducted a study of the effects of the mandatory disclosure system 
in the U.S. They concluded that: 
These [disclosure! programs are characterized by wealth transfers from investors 
and corporations for whom the cost is not great on a per capita basis to a relatively 
small group of processors, which includes securities lawyers, accountants, secu­
rity analysts, and of course the SEC's employees. There is insufficient economic 
incentive by the members of the taxed groups to organize in opposition to this 
type of regulation. 
Assuming that an empirical study would yield similar results in Canada, it 
could be argued that increased accountability is the regulatory price to be paid 
for the redistribution of wealth to professionals that is occasioned by the 
mandatory disclosure system. 
Finally, an argument might be mounted that the ability to sanction 
securities lawyers is necessary to maintain institutional integrity itself. This is 
a more specific version of the proposition concerning the role of lawyers as 
facilitators of transactions. Given the task of "order maintenance" allocated to 
various regulatory agencies, including the OSC, their position may be analo­
gous to that of criminal courts, where judges have the power to sanction 
defence lawyers in the interests of maintaining the integrity of court proceed­
ings. This idea is discussed by Beck (at p. 255), though he seems ultimately 
to reject it. For one thing, to have any bite in the securities setting, the 
argument would have to be extended to include the integrity of the regulatory 
process generally, rather than being confined to the various situations in which 
the OSC may hold hearings pursuant to its statutory powers. 
In resisting the prospect ot sanctions for their role in client wrongdoing, 
lawyers frequently cite the importance of solicitor/client privilege. That is. to 
defend themselves against the possibility of sanctions, lawyers would have to 
reveal to regulators confidential information from the client's file. Beck 
3 Securities Amendment Act. 1994, s.  2. 
4 Phillips, S.M and J.R. Zecher, The SEC and the Public Interest (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press 1981) at 118. 
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disposes of this argument by pointing out that a variety of accountability 
mechanisms could be envisaged which would not necessarily harm the client 
in this reeard. I would simply add that Beck's account of the action taken by 
the Office of Thrift Supervision in the U.S. against the law firm of Kaye, 
Scholer for their part in the failure of the Lincoln Savings and Loan Associa­
tion suggests that professionals are willing to alert other professionals to 
difficulties caused by the client's activities. Thus (at 27), "Kaye, Scholer had 
been told by a senior partner at Arthur Anderson of the serious concerns that 
Anderson had with respect to Lincoln's operations and that they were "high 
risk clients" for a number of reasons relating to their operating strategies". It 
may be rebutted that accountants do not have the same privileged relationship 
with clients that lawyers do, but this argument is unlikely to appease the 
"outside" investor who has suffered financial loss as a result of only selective 
dissemination of information about the client. 
For What? 
I can deal only briefly with the arguments made in the paper concerning 
the appropriate nature of legal advisor accountability. The author looks to the 
work of Wilkins? to argue that we need to move to a more "context-sensitive" 
notion of accountability, and that the standards of conduct we expect should 
reflect the occupational tasks of securities lawyers, and the actual opportuni­
ties for wrongdoing. In his work, Wilkins suggests that the context-specific 
standards for thrift lawyers in the U.S. should be those of (1) independent 
counselling, that is, counselling with respect to the spirit as well as the 
technicalities of rules, and advice about the likely regulatory attitude to a 
transaction: (2) cooperation with regulators in collecting information, along 
with a prohibition on assisting clients to impede the regulator: and (3) disclo­
sure of disputes with the client about adherence to a particular regulation, both 
to the client's board and to the regulator. Each of these standards reflects a 
different level of obligation and Wilkins'implication is that breaches of all of 
them could potentially attract sanctions. 
In applying this analysis to securities lawyers, Beck's paper seems to 
favour a scenario involving the application of standards somewhere between 
#1 and #2 on Wilkin's scale. The proposal (at pp. 241, 262) is that liability 
should accrue for failure to withhold cooperation from a client who wishes to 
breach the terms of the Act or the regulations. What is envisaged therefore is 
more than an obligation on lawyers to "independently" counsel the client, but 
less than active professional cooperation with regulators. One effect of adopt­
ing these standards is that the regulatory obligations on lawyers, if cooperation 
w 'as appropriately withheld, could be maintained within the privacy of the 
5 Wilkins. D.B. "Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers after Kaye. Scholer ,  [1993] 
66 Southern California Law Review 1 145. 
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solicitor/client relationship, without a requirement for active disclosure to 
regulators and the public. However, at least two unanswered questions remain 
as a result of pitching responsibility at this level. 
(1) If investor protection and confidence are the ultimate goals, is it 
sufficiently likely that this level of obligation on lawyers will achieve them'5 
The proposal is based on an assumption that the withholding of cooperation 
by legal counsel would have the effect of making clients change their behav­
iour, if investor protection results are to be achieved. Can regulators be 
sufficiently confident that the deterrent effect of these sanctions on lawyers 
will outweigh pressures in the market for legal services, such that the client 
will not simply find another lawyer to facilitate the transaction? 
(2) Securities lawyers will need some guidelines from regulators to enable 
them to decide when withholding cooperation is required. Presumably the 
desired end result of behavioural reform by the client will not be achieved if 
an "independent counselling" obligation is not absorbed in the requirement to 
withhold cooperation. Otherwise clients would not know when and how their 
actions could be in breach of securities law. Will it always be clear to lawyers 
when further advice is fruitless and the time has come to resign from the file? 
Infamous Securities Commission cases like Canadian Tireb illustrate the 
difficulties involved in relying on ex post facto decisions to communicate 
understanding about regulatory objectives, if lawyers are to have responsibil­
ity for counselling clients concerning them. 
How? 
If the notion of context-specific standards for securities lawyers is ac­
cepted in the manner advocated by Beck, then a question arises concerning the 
appropriate body to be responsible for enforcing them. The primary contenders 
appear to be the OSC and the Law Society. At least two points can be made 
about this matter. One has to do with the issue of relative institutional 
competence. Is the Law Society likely to have adequate knowledge of the 
context in which securities lawyers work and their "gatekeeping" role, in order 
to be an effective enforcer? Would the market regulator not be better placed 
to engage in this task? Indeed, it is easy to see that the regulatory interests of 
the OSC and the Law Society might differ with respect to this matter. The Law 
Society would be primarily concerned with disciplining lawyers so as to 
prevent loss of reputation by the profession, while the OSC would regulate 
securities lawyers as an aspect of their role in regulating the investment 
process generally. On the other hand, of course, the argument can be made that 
self-regulation has been generally accepted as an organising principle of the 
Ontario securities markets. However, the statute recognises the OSC's ability 
to oversee the regulatory activities of recognised self-regulatory organisa­
6 (19871, 10 O.S.C.B 857. 
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tions Is it too far-fetched to envisage a similar oversight function with respect 
10 '^ndTfbaUle is joined over who is to have power to discipline, it may 
H rtr,t securities lawyers would prefer to have control residing in the 
However the current market for iega, services may be such that 
y could  be in lawyers' interests for standards to be tmposed by ?" -*™ 
' ulator In other words, externally-defined and enforced standards nught 
reate more of a "level playing field" for professionals eompet.ng tor clients 
n the same wav that information disclosure is supposed to provide a level 
• „  field" for investors In any event, there is much food for thought in 
m/b^'s challenging paper, and further developments will be awaited wtth 
